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TITLE: THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOL. 2
AUTHOR: BARON D'HOLBACH
EBOOK: E06232 (O'Briens Book Cellar)
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

PRODUCTION NOTES: First published in French in 1770 under the
pseudonym of Mirabaud.  This e-book based on a facsimile reprint
of an English translation originally published 1820-21.
This e-text covers the second of the original two volumes.

THE
SYSTEM OF NATURE;

or,

_THE LAWS_
of the
MORAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD.

TRANSLATED
FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH OF
M. DE MIRABAUD

VOL. II.

CONTENTS

      PART II.  Of the Divinity.--Proofs of his existence.--
      Of his attributes.--Of his influence over the happiness of man.

CHAP. I.  The origin of man's ideas upon the Divinity.

CHAP. II.  Of mythology.--Of theology

CHAP. III.  Of the confused and contradictory ideas of theology.

CHAP. IV.  Examination of the proofs of the existence of the Divinity,
as given by Clarke.

CHAP. V.  Examination of the proofs offered by Descartes, Malebranche,
Newton, &c.

CHAP. VI.  Of Pantheism; or of the natural ideas of the Divinity.

CHAP. VII.  Of Theism--Of the System of Optimism--Of Final Causes

CHAP. VIII.  Examination of the Advantages which result from Man's
Notions on the Divinity;--of their Influence upon Morals;--upon
Politics;--upon Science;--upon the Happiness of Nations, and that
of individuals.

CHAP. IX.  Theological Notions cannot be the Basis of Morality.--
Comparison between Theological Ethics and Natural Morality--
Theology prejudicial to the Human Mind.

CHAP. X.  Man can form no Conclusion from the Ideas which are offered
him of the Divinity.--Of their want of just Inference.--Of the Inutility
of his Conduct.

CHAP. XI  Defence of the Sentiments contained in this Work.--Of Impiety.--
Do there exist Atheists?

CHAP. XII.  Is what is termed Atheism, compatible with Morality?

CHAP. XIII.  Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called Atheism.--
Can this System be dangerous?--Can it be embraced by the Illiterate?

CHAP. XIV.  A summary of the Code of Nature.

A Brief Sketch of the Life and Writings of M. de Mirabaud

MIRABAUD'S
SYSTEM OF NATURE

Translated from the Original
BY SAMUEL WILKINSON

     PART II.

     ON THE DIVINITY:--PROOFS OF HIS EXISTENCE:--OF HIS ATTRIBUTES:
     OF HIS INFLUENCE OVER THE HAPPINESS OF MAN.

CHAP. I.

_The Origin of Man's Ideas upon the Divinity._

If man possessed the courage, if he had the requisite industry to recur
to the source of those opinions which are most deeply engraven on his
brain; if he rendered to himself a faithful account of the reasons which
make him hold these opinions as sacred; if he coolly examined the basis
of his hopes, the foundation of his fears, he would find that it very
frequently happens, those objects, or those ideas which move him most
powerfully, either have no real existence, or are words devoid of
meaning, which terror has conjured up to explain some sudden disaster;
that they are often phantoms engendered by a disordered imagination,
modified by ignorance; the effect of an ardent mind distracted by
contending passions, which prevent him from either reasoning justly, or
consulting experience in his judgment; that this mind often labours with
a precipitancy that throws his intellectual faculties into confusion;
that bewilders his ideas; that consequently he gives a substance and a
form to chimeras, to airy nothings, which he afterwards idolizes from
sloth, reverences from prejudice.

A sensible being placed in a nature where every part is in motion, has
various feelings, in consequence of either the agreeable or disagreeable
effects which he is obliged to experience from this continued action and
re-action; in consequence he either finds himself happy or miserable;
according to the quality of the sensations excited in him, he will love
or fear, seek after or fly from, the real or supposed causes of such
marked effects operated on his machine. But if he is ignorant of nature,
if he is destitute of experience, he will frequently deceive himself as
to these causes; for want of either capability or inclination to recur
back to them, he will neither have a true knowledge of their energy, nor
a clear idea of their mode of acting: thus until reiterated experience
shall have formed his ideas, until the mirror of truth shall have shewn
him the judgment he ought to make, he will be involved in trouble, a
prey to incertitude, a victim to credulity.

Man is a being who brings with him nothing into the world save an
aptitude to feeling in a manner more or less lively according to his
individual organization: he has no innate knowledge of any of the causes
that act upon him: by degrees his faculty of feeling discovers to him
their various qualities; he learns to judge of them; time familiarizes
him with their properties; he attaches ideas to them, according to the
manner in which they have affected him; these ideas are correct or
otherwise, in a ratio to the soundness of his organic structure: his
judgment is faulty or not, as these organs are either well or ill-
constituted; in proportion as they are competent to afford him sure and
reiterated experience.

The first moments of man are marked by his wants; that is to say, the
first impulse he receives is to conserve his existence; this he would
not be able to maintain without the concurrence of many analogous
causes: these wants in a sensible being, manifest themselves by a
general languor, a sinking, a confusion in his machine, which gives him
the consciousness of a painful sensation: this derangement subsists, is
even augmented, until the cause suitable to remove it re-establishes the
harmony so necessary to the existence of the human frame. Want,
therefore, is the first evil man experiences; nevertheless it is
requisite to the maintenance of his existence. Was it not for this
derangement of his body, which obliges him to furnish its remedy, he
would not be warned of the necessity of preserving the existence he has
received. Without wants man would be an insensible machine, similar to a
vegetable; like that he would be incapable of preserving himself; he
would not be competent to using the means required to conserve his
being. To his wants are to be ascribed his passions; his desires; the
exercise of his corporeal functions; the play of his intellectual
faculties: they are his wants that oblige him to think; that determine
his will, that induce him to act; it is to satisfy them or rather to put
an end to the painful sensations excited by their presence, that
according to his capacity, to the natural sensibility of his soul, to
the energies which are peculiar to himself, he gives play to his
faculties, exerts the activity of his bodily strength, or displays the
extensive powers of his mind. His wants being perpetual, he is obliged
to labour without relaxation, to procure objects competent to satisfy
them. In a word, it is owing to his multiplied wants that man's energy
is kept in a state of continual activity: as soon as he ceases to have
wants, he falls into inaction--becomes listless--declines into apathy--
sinks into a languor that is incommodious to his feelings or prejudicial
to his existence: this lethargic state of weariness lasts until new
wants, by giving him fresh activity, rouse his dormant faculties--throw
off his stupor--re-animate his vigour, and destroy the sluggishness to
which he had become a prey.

From hence it will be obvious that evil is necessary to man; without it
he would neither be in a condition to know that which injures him; to
avoid its presence; or to seek his own welfare: without this stimulus,
he would differ in nothing from insensible, unorganized beings: if those
evanescent evils which he calls _wants_, did not oblige him to call
forth his faculties, to set his energies in motion, to cull experience,
to compare objects, to discriminate them, to separate those which have
the capabilities to injure him, from those which possess the means to
benefit him, he would be insensible to happiness--inadequate to
enjoyment. In short, _without evil man would be ignorant of good_; he
would be continually exposed to perish like the leaf on a tree. He would
resemble an infant, who, destitute of experience, runs the risque of
meeting his destruction at every step he takes, unguarded by his nurse.
What the nurse is to the child, experience is to the adult; when either
are wanting, these children of different lustres generally go astray:
frequently encounter disaster. Without evil he would be unable to judge
of any thing; he would have no preference; his will would be without
volition, he would be destitute of passions; desire would find no place
in his heart; he would not revolt at the most disgusting objects; he
would not strive to put them away; he would neither have stimuli to
love, nor motives to fear any thing; he would be an insensible
automaton; he would no longer be a man.

If no evil had existed in this world, man would never have dreamt of
those numerous divinities, to whom he has rendered such various modes of
worship. If nature had permitted him easily to satisfy all his
regenerating wants, if she had given him none but agreeable sensations,
his days would have uninterruptedly rolled on in one perpetual
uniformity; he would never have discovered his own nakedness; he would
never have had motives to search after the unknown causes of things--to
meditate in pain. Therefore man, always contented, would only have
occupied himself with satisfying his wants; with enjoying the present,
with feeling the influence of objects, that would unceasingly warn him
of his existence in a mode that he must necessarily approve; nothing
would alarm his heart; every thing would be analogous to his existence:
he would neither know fear, experience distrust, nor have inquietude for
the future: these feelings can only be the consequence of some

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